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BAR BRIEFS
the Bill of Rights enacted on December 16, 1689 in the reign of
William and Mary; the Declaration of Indeepndence adopted on the
4th day of July, 1776, which among other things provides: "We
hold these truths to be self-evident, that ALL men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness." The Constitution of the United States adopted in
1787 and the subsequent amendments which provide among other
things, "The trial of all crimes except in cases of impeachment,
shall be by jury." Article V providing that: "No person shall be
held to answere for an infamous crime unless on the presentation
or indictment of a Grand Jury or be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy, nor to be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against 'himself nor be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law." The Sixth Amendment
which provides as follows; "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right of a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committeed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense." Similar provisions may be found in the constitutions of various states.
To what purpose, it may be asked, should these matters of
substance and of procedure be set down in these solemn documents
if lawyers are to adopt the view suggested in the foregoing charge
under this count? Guilt or innocence is incapable of simple and
easy determination. Over-simplification of this question lies at
the bottom of all lynch law. It involves investigation of such matters as intent, malice, premediation, matters in mitigation, justification, excuse, matters involving questions of environment and
heredity and mental responsibility. All of these are pertinent and
relevant to the inquiry as to guilt or innocence.
It follows that no man can be said to be guilty under the law
unless he confesses his guilt in open court by plea or is convicted
in the manner and form provided by the law.
Thus, the principle involved is a legal rather than a moral one.
The lawyer who defends a person charged with crime is not only
entitled to but is in duty bound to insist that government itself
should abide by the salutary rules above mentioned.
The Defense rests.
-Francis Murphy
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In Presbytery of Bismarck, a religious corporation, et al., Pltfs. and
Applts., vs. S. J. Allen, et al, and the First Presbyterian Church of Leith,
N. D., Defdts. and Resps.
That where property or contract rights of religious organizations are
concerned, civil courts will assume jurisdiction.
That where a local religious society, be it either an association or
corporation, is a subordinate member of a general church organization,
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with superior ecclesiastical tribunals, with the ultimate power in some
supreme judicatory, distinguished as the Presbyterian type, its property is
not owned by the local organization or the individuals thereof, but is held
in trust for the general church body to be used in accordance with the
decisions of the superior church judicatory.
That where a local church society incorporates for the purpose of
promoting worship according to the constitution, laws, and usages of the
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, and acquires church
property, and thereafter its congregation votes to separate itself from such
Presbyterian Church without the consent of the Church Judicatory in authority, and then erects itself into a different and hostile organization,
the use and control of the local church property remain with the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, and subject to the authority of the proper church judicatory. Appeal from the District Court of
Grant County, Lowe, J. REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Hutchinson, Dist. J. Burr, J. disq.
In the Matter of the Application of Midwest Motor Express, Inc.,
Northern Pac. Ry. Company, a corporation, Applt., vs. S. S. McDonald,
et al, as members of Public Service Commission, et al, Respt.
That statute which requires the Public Service Commission, before
granting a certificate of public convenience and necessity, to a common
carrier by motor vehicle, to take into consideration travel on the proposed
route, increased cost of maintaining the highways, the existing transportation facilities in the territory to be served and the effect granting of
such certificate will have upon those facilities and prohibiting the granting
of such certificate where the service furnished or that could be furnished
by existing transportation facilities is reasonably adequate, is a restriction
upon the power of the Public Service Commission to grant certificates of
public convenience and necessity to carriers by motor vehicles (Sec.
49-1814, R. C. 43.)
That under the public policy of this state, as declared by the legislature, public convenience and necessity do not require additional transportation service by common carrier motor vehicles to a territory that already has reasonably adequate service or where the additional service
will create ruinous competition or materially impair the existing service to
any part of the territory.
That statutes, relating to appeals from administrative agencies, require
a trial de novo in District Court upon the record, upon an appeal from
a determination of the Public Service Commission and also a trial de novo
upon an appeal from the District Court to the Supreme Court where appellant demands a review of the entire case. (Sections 28-3219, 28-3221,
28-2732, R. C. 1943).
That daily freight service by "hotshot" car atttached to a daily
passenger train and tri-weekly service by way of freight with pickup and
delivery service on 1. c. 1. shipments is held to be reasonably adequate
service to a territory where the 1. c. 1. volume averages 3 to 7 tons on the
daily freight and 8 to 12 tons on the way freight, where there is no evidence
of special circumstances requiring additional service and where there is a
possibility that the granting of additional service would materially impair
the existing service to a part of the territory.
REAppeal from the District Court of Mercer County, Berry J.
VERSED. Opinion of the Court by Burke, J.
In W. M. Covertson, Pltf. and Respt. vs. Grand Forks County, a
Municipal Corporation, et al., Defts. and Respts. and Oscar 0. Odegaard
and James P. Keogh, Defts. and Respts.
That where the county auditor, being charged with the duty of giving
notice of expiration of the period of redemption to a delinquent taxpayer,
follows the statutory procedure prescribed for service of such notice, the
service is valid and is effective to extinguish the owner's right of redemption though the notice was not actually received by him
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That where a county sells property acquired through tax deed proceedings at the annual sale prescribed by Ch. 286, Sess. Laws N. D. 1941,
the sale is complete when a bid is accepted by the County auditor and the
payment required is made by the bidder.
That Chapter 286, Sess. Laws N. D. 1941, gives to the former owner
of real estate forefeited to the county under tax deed proceedings the
right to repurchase the real estate so long as the tax title thereto remains
in the county.
That where a successful bidder at the annual tax sale of property
acquired by the county under tax deed proceedings fails to pay the amount
required by statute into the county treasury and the original owner
tenders the amount necessary to repurchase in accordance with the terms
of the statute prior to the delivery of a deed to the bidder, a valid
repurchase is effected and a deed thereafter delivered to the bidder is a
nullity.
Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, Hon. P. G.
Swenson, Judge. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
In J. E. Novak, Pltf. and Applt. vs. Anna M. Novak, Deft. and Respt
That the word "may" as ordinarily used in a statute is permissive
only and operates to confer discretion; but depending upon the context
and circumstances under which it is used it sometimes may be construed
as being mandatory and the equivalent of the word "must."
That permissive words in a statute which confers power and authority
upon a public officer or body will be held to be mandatory when the
act authorized to be done concerns the public interest or the rights of
individuals and it appears that the legislature intended the statute to
be mandatory in character.
That Section 14-0605, Revised Code 1943, providing that "When a
decree for separation, forever or for a limited period, shall have been
pronounced, it may be revoked at any time thereafter by the judge by
whom it was pronounced or by his successor, under such regulations and
restrictions as the judge may impose. Application for revocation may
be made by either party to the decree. * * * If it shall be made to
appear on the hearing of such application that the original decree has
been in existence and force for more than four years and that reconcilliation between the parties to the marriage is improbable, the judge
may revoke the separate maintenance decree and, in lieu thereof, may
render a decree absolutely divorcing the parties * * *.", is construed,
and it is HELD, for reasons stated in the opinion that the statute is not
mandatory in character and that the word "may" as used therein is permissive and not mandatory.
That the record is examined and HELD, for reasons stated in the opinion, that there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of the plaintiff's
application for the revocation of the decree for separation and maintenance.
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. Fred
Jansonius, J.
Application for the revocation of a degree of separate
maintenance and for a decree of divorce in lieu thereof. From an order
denying the application, plaintiff appeals.
AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Nuessle, J.

